been well recognised for decades.The been well recognised for decades.The change to smaller, professiona change to smaller, professional armed l armed forces has reduced the risk of large-scale forces has reduced the risk of large-scale acute psychiatric casualties, and should acute psychiatric casualties, and should have led to a corresponding decrease in have led to a corresponding decrease in long-term ill health, butthis expected long-term ill health, butthis expected reduction seems notto have happened. reduction seems notto have happened. Likewise, attempts at preventing Likewise, attempts at preventing psychiatric injury, by screening before psychiatric injury, by screening before deployment or debriefing after, have been deployment or debriefing after, have been disappointing.Three reasons for this are disappointing.Three reasons for this are proposed: a rethinking of the relationship proposed: a rethinking of the relationship between trauma and long-term outcome, between trauma and long-term outcome, catalysed by the attempts of US society to catalysed by the attempts of US society to come to terms with theVietnam conflict; a come to terms with theVietnam conflict; a broadening of the scope of psychiatric broadening of the scope of psychiatric injury as it moved to the civilian sector; injury as it moved to the civilian sector; and the increased prominence of and the increased prominence of unexplained syndromes and contested unexplained syndromes and contested diagnoses such as Gulf War syndrome. diagnoses such as Gulf War syndrome. Traditionalpsychiatric injuryis predictable, Traditionalpsychiatric injuryis predictable, proportionate proportionate and can, in theory, be and can, in theory, be managed.These newer forms of injury are managed.These newer forms of injury are in contrast unanticipated, paradoxical, ill in contrast unanticipated, paradoxical, ill understood and hard to manage. understood and hard to manage. Traditional approaches Traditional approaches to risk to risk management by reducing exposure have management by reducing exposure have not been successful, and may increase risk not been successful, and may increase risk aversion and reduce resilience.However, aversion and reduce resilience.However, the experiences of civilians in wartime or the experiences of civilians in wartime or the military show that people are not the military show that people are not intrinsically risk-averse, provided they can intrinsically risk-averse, provided they can see purpose in accepting risk. see purpose in accepting risk.
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We are becoming obsessed with risk. Use of We are becoming obsessed with risk. Use of the word itself is increasing in epidemic the word itself is increasing in epidemic proportions, not only in the mass media proportions, not only in the mass media but in the medical journals (Skolbekken, but in the medical journals . Not for nothing has Beck's 1995). Not for nothing has Beck's Risk Risk Society Society become one of the most influential become one of the most influential contemporary social texts (Beck, 1992) . contemporary social texts (Beck, 1992) . Reducing risk is increasingly the purpose Reducing risk is increasingly the purpose of public health, and indeed politics. Whenof public health, and indeed politics. Whenever anything is identified as a 'risk', it is ever anything is identified as a 'risk', it is inevitable that this is closely followed by inevitable that this is closely followed by calls to remove it. However, there remains calls to remove it. However, there remains one section of society whose one section of society whose raison d'etre raison d'eˆtre is to take risks: the armed forces. That is is to take risks: the armed forces. That is the nature of the military contract (Dandeker, the nature of the military contract (Dandeker, 2001) . So when men (and increasingly 2001) . So when men (and increasingly women) go to war, it remains the case, now women) go to war, it remains the case, now and then, that some do not come back, some and then, that some do not come back, some come back physically injured, and some come back physically injured, and some come back with invisible but often equally come back with invisible but often equally damaging psychiatric injuries. The notion damaging psychiatric injuries. The notion that a military operation could ever be that a military operation could ever be free of physical casualties is something free of physical casualties is something devoutly to be wished for but unlikely to be devoutly to be wished for but unlikely to be achieved, achieved, and so it is with psychiatric and so it is with psychiatric casualties. casualties.
War provides an exaggerated, perhaps War provides an exaggerated, perhaps extreme, version of the entire range of extreme, version of the entire range of human experience -not just fear, hate human experience -not just fear, hate and guilt, but also excitement, love, friendand guilt, but also excitement, love, friendship and achievement . ship and achievement . There is no single 'experience of war', for There is no single 'experience of war', for good or ill. There are some for whom active good or ill. There are some for whom active service remains the best thing that ever service remains the best thing that ever happened to them, and for whom life afterhappened to them, and for whom life afterwards is dull and monochromic. For many, wards is dull and monochromic. For many, though, especially those who are not part though, especially those who are not part of modern, professional, volunteer miliof modern, professional, volunteer militaries, war is not the 'best days of their taries, war is not the 'best days of their lives', and when they return appear hale lives', and when they return appear hale in body, but not in mind. It is these in body, but not in mind. It is these experiences that form the first part of this experiences that form the first part of this paper. paper.
PSYCHIATRIC BREAKDOWN: PSYCHIATRIC BREAKDOWN: ACUTE AND CHRONIC ACUTE AND CHRONIC
The first of my two themes is risk and The first of my two themes is risk and psychological breakdown -what it is, psychological breakdown -what it is, why it is so difficult to prevent, but easier why it is so difficult to prevent, but easier to manage, and why the armed forces have to manage, and why the armed forces have little to fear from psychiatry. little to fear from psychiatry.
We know a great deal about psychiatric We know a great deal about psychiatric breakdown in battle. If you read classic breakdown in battle. If you read classic accounts of military psychiatry, you will accounts of military psychiatry, you will learn much about the acute psychiatric learn much about the acute psychiatric casualties of war (Belenky, 1987) . Military casualties of war (Belenky, 1987) . Military psychiatry is based on doctrines developed psychiatry is based on doctrines developed and tested in both World Wars. Modern and tested in both World Wars. Modern textbooks textbooks have not much changed in their have not much changed in their descriptions descriptions of the acute breakdown, the of the acute breakdown, the combat stress reaction or the soldier frozen combat stress reaction or the soldier frozen with fear. Careful statistical inquiries in the with fear. Careful statistical inquiries in the Second World War related this to the intenSecond World War related this to the intensity of fighting -the greater the number of sity of fighting -the greater the number of physical casualties, the greater the number physical casualties, the greater the number of psychiatric casualties (Jones & Wessely, of psychiatric casualties (Jones & Wessely, 2001) . Over the next half-century, it is true 2001). Over the next half-century, it is true to say that our basic understanding of the to say that our basic understanding of the immediate psychiatric consequences of immediate psychiatric consequences of com combat did not change much (Belenky bat did not change much . , 1985) . Acute psychiatric breakdown refers to Acute psychiatric breakdown refers to the short-term consequences, but what the short-term consequences, but what about the long term? Once again, accepabout the long term? Once again, acceptance of the long-term psychiatric costs of tance of the long-term psychiatric costs of war is nothing new. The hundreds of thouwar is nothing new. The hundreds of thousands of pensions paid under the labels of sands of pensions paid under the labels of 'shell shock', 'effort syndrome', 'war neuro-'shell shock', 'effort syndrome', 'war neurosis' and 'neurasthenia' meant that the longsis' and 'neurasthenia' meant that the longterm consequences could hardly be denied term consequences could hardly be denied by later generations, even before the advent by later generations, even before the advent of of 'post-traumatic stress disorder' (Jones 'post-traumatic stress disorder' (Jones et et al al, , 2002) . It was the fact that both the 2002). It was the fact that both the USA and the UK began the Second World USA and the UK began the Second World War with asylums still full of ex-service War with asylums still full of ex-service men, and a staggering pensions bill left over men, and a staggering pensions bill left over from the Great War, that they were deterfrom the Great War, that they were determined to do things better this time around mined to do things better this time around . Furthermore, on the basis of their own observations, confirmed by later careown observations, confirmed by later careful long-term follow-up studies of war ful long-term follow-up studies of war veterans from the USA and Israel, they veterans from the USA and Israel, they would have predicted that those who stayed would have predicted that those who stayed well in the short term were likely to stay well in the short term were likely to stay well in the long term ; Lee well in the long term Lee et al et al, 1995) . The best predictor of long-, 1995) . The best predictor of longterm ill health was acute ill health during term ill health was acute ill health during conflict. conflict.
However, these assumptions would However, these assumptions would only have been half correct. Evidence from only have been half correct. Evidence from the Falklands conflict, the Persian Gulf War the Falklands conflict, the Persian Gulf War and the opening phase of the Iraq war and the opening phase of the Iraq war suggest that classic psychiatric casualtiessuggest that classic psychiatric casualties -'combat 'combat stress reactions' as we now call stress reactions' as we now call them -have indeed been relatively few, them -have indeed been relatively few, and have created little in the way of operaand have created little in the way of operational difficulties; tional difficulties; but it is the apparent but it is the apparent long-term consequences of recent operalong-term consequences of recent operations that would have been both a surprise tions that would have been both a surprise and a puzzle to our predecessors. For and a puzzle to our predecessors. For example, as I write this only a few weeks example, as I write this only a few weeks after President Bush declared active hostiliafter President Bush declared active hostilities 'over', American newspapers are ties 'over', American newspapers are making predictions that up to 25% of their making predictions that up to 25% of their military personnel in Iraq will become military personnel in Iraq will become victims of post-traumatic stress disorder victims of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), despite the fact that casualties (PTSD), despite the fact that casualties during the invasion were remarkably few, during the invasion were remarkably few, and their victory overwhelming. Perusal of and their victory overwhelming. Perusal of some of the recent British media might lead some of the recent British media might lead to similar conclusions. to similar conclusions.
What has changed is the expected link What has changed is the expected link between short-term and long-term outbetween short-term and long-term outcomes. It no longer seems to be the case comes. It no longer seems to be the case that the level of short-term acute psychithat the level of short-term acute psychiatric casualties is a good guide to long-term atric casualties is a good guide to long-term consequences. At the heart of this change consequences. At the heart of this change has been a fundamental shift in contemhas been a fundamental shift in contemporary formulations of why some people porary formulations of why some people do not seem to recover from the acute psydo not seem to recover from the acute psychiatric injuries of war. For the first half of chiatric injuries of war. For the first half of the 20th century it was assumed that if you the 20th century it was assumed that if you broke down in battle, and the cause was broke down in battle, and the cause was indeed the stress of war, then your illness indeed the stress of war, then your illness would be short-lived -and if it was not, would be short-lived -and if it was not, then the cause of your ill health was not then the cause of your ill health was not really the war at all, but events before you really the war at all, but events before you went to war. At the risk of oversimplificawent to war. At the risk of oversimplification, if you belonged to the dominant tion, if you belonged to the dominant school of psychiatric thinking from the school of psychiatric thinking from the latter half of the 19th century to the latter latter half of the 19th century to the latter half of the 20th century, then the reason half of the 20th century, then the reason was hereditary. This could be expressed in was hereditary. This could be expressed in terms of 'degeneration', which gave way terms of 'degeneration', which gave way to genetic concepts, but it was your conto genetic concepts, but it was your constitutional inheritance that determined stitutional inheritance that determined most psychiatric disorders other than the most psychiatric disorders other than the transient. In apparent contrast, Freud and transient. In apparent contrast, Freud and the founders of psychoanalysis said that the founders of psychoanalysis said that the cause was your parents and the way they the cause was your parents and the way they treated you in your first few months and treated you in your first few months and years. Either way it was much the sameyears. Either way it was much the sameyour cards were marked, and well marked, your cards were marked, and well marked, long before you joined the Services. In long before you joined the Services. In war eventually every man had his breaking war eventually every man had his breaking point, but if you broke down and never point, but if you broke down and never recovered, then the real cause was not the recovered, then the real cause was not the war, but either your genetic inheritance or war, but either your genetic inheritance or your upbringing. The war was merely the your upbringing. (Glass,1974) . strength' (Glass,1974) .
Psychiatric casualties were 'surprisingly Psychiatric casualties were 'surprisingly low' . Casualties were, reported low' . Casualties were, reported another psychiatrist, ten times lower than another psychiatrist, ten times lower than in the Second World War, and three times in the Second World War, and three times lower than in Korea, or lower than 'any lower than in Korea, or lower than 'any recorded in previous conflicts' said a third recorded in previous conflicts' said a third . Likewise, the . Likewise, the implementation of forward psychiatry implementation of forward psychiatry created the 'impression that psychiatric created the 'impression that psychiatric casualties were rarely produced by the casualties were rarely produced by the unique nature of combat in Vietnam' unique nature of combat in Vietnam' , while 'psychiatric casualties , while 'psychiatric casualties need never again become a major cause of need never again become a major cause of attrition in the United States military in a attrition in the United States military in a combat zone' . It is possible, combat zone' . It is possible, as Ben Shephard argues, that these accounts as Ben Shephard argues, that these accounts were self-serving . There is were self-serving . There is also evidence that substance misuse and also evidence that substance misuse and behavioural problems were rife even in the behavioural problems were rife even in the early days of the conflict (De Groot, early days of the conflict (De Groot, 2000) , but nevertheless standard psychi-2000), but nevertheless standard psychiatric doctrine would have predicted that atric doctrine would have predicted that these problems would not be on the scale these problems would not be on the scale seen in previous seen in previous wars, and should not have wars, and should not have given rise to what was reported by Lifton, given rise to what was reported by Lifton, Shatan and others. Shatan and others.
However, as the war drew to its However, as the war drew to its unsatisfactory (for the USA at least) close, unsatisfactory (for the USA at least) close, and the soldiers started to come home, the and the soldiers started to come home, the picture changed dramatically. By the picture changed dramatically. By the 1970s the Vietnam veteran came increas1970s the Vietnam veteran came increasingly to be seen as a major social ingly to be seen as a major social problem -alienated, abandoned, disturbed problem -alienated, abandoned, disturbed by nightmares of atrocities seen and by nightmares of atrocities seen and committed, out of control, violent, suicidal committed, out of control, violent, suicidal and a social time bomb. To explain this and a social time bomb. To explain this phenomenon psychiatrists rapidly introphenomenon psychiatrists rapidly introduced a new condition into the psychiatric duced a new condition into the psychiatric lexicon -the diagnosis of post-traumatic lexicon -the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). stress disorder (PTSD) .
So what was new about PTSD? That So what was new about PTSD? That war could lead to large numbers of menwar could lead to large numbers of mentally ill soldiers was not news; but the existtally ill soldiers was not news; but the existing doctrines said confidently that it should ing doctrines said confidently that it should not have happened after Vietnam, since not have happened after Vietnam, since standard teaching linked the numbers of standard teaching linked the numbers of acute psychiatric casualties with the numacute psychiatric casualties with the numbers of chronic casualties. If you ended bers of chronic casualties. If you ended the war mentally unscathed, then you were the war mentally unscathed, then you were likely to stay that way. Second, doctrine likely to stay that way. Second, doctrine taught that if you did develop long-term taught that if you did develop long-term psychiatric disorder, then the war was only psychiatric disorder, then the war was only the trigger, not the real cause. However, the the trigger, not the real cause. However, the formulators of PTSD did not accept that. formulators of PTSD did not accept that. They believed, for honourable reasons, that They believed, for honourable reasons, that the war was unquestionably to blame. It the war was unquestionably to blame. It was an insane, unpopular and unjust conwas an insane, unpopular and unjust conflict, and the US Vietnam veterans were as flict, and the US Vietnam veterans were as much its victims as the Vietnamese civilians. much its victims as the Vietnamese civilians.
The cause of PTSD was the 'T', the The cause of PTSD was the 'T', the trauma. Both the attraction and the danger trauma. Both the attraction and the danger of this concept lay its simplicity -here at of this concept lay its simplicity -here at last was a psychiatric disorder with a last was a psychiatric disorder with a simple cause: adult trauma. We could simple cause: adult trauma. We could dispense with all the difficult business of dispense with all the difficult business of heredity, upbringing and so on, and heredity, upbringing and so on, and concentrate on the matter in hand -the concentrate on the matter in hand -the experience of Vietnam. In fact it was too experience of Vietnam. In fact it was too simple, and many soon realised that the simple, and many soon realised that the individual's predisposition, the bag and individual's predisposition, the bag and baggage that one brought to military serbaggage that one brought to military service, continued to have an important role, vice, continued to have an important role, especially when rates and intensity of trauespecially when rates and intensity of trauma were relatively low. Nevertheless, it ma were relatively low. Nevertheless, it would still take many years before people would still take many years before people began to accept that a major cause of the began to accept that a major cause of the Vietnam veteran problem lay not solely in Vietnam veteran problem lay not solely in the jungles of Vietnam, but also in the social the jungles of Vietnam, but also in the social climate of an America that was turning climate of an America that was turning against the war in particular, and the military against the war in particular, and the military in general Wessely & Jones, in general (Scott, 1993; Wessely & Jones, 2004) . Indeed, one of the reasons for the mod-2004). Indeed, one of the reasons for the modest, to put it kindly, successes of the vast and est, to put it kindly, successes of the vast and costly programme of psychological treatcostly programme of psychological treatments for Vietnam veterans may have been ments for Vietnam veterans may have been because it was rooted too much in the jungles because it was rooted too much in the jungles of Vietnam, and paid too little attention either of Vietnam, and paid too little attention either to contemporary American culture or the to contemporary American culture or the iatrogenic role of the government's response iatrogenic role of the government's response Johnson, 2004) . Johnson, 2004) .
THE RISE OF THE CULTURE THE RISE OF THE CULTURE OF TR AUMA OF TRAUMA
Moving on to the present, is the British Moving on to the present, is the British military really now facing an epidemic of military really now facing an epidemic of PTSD? The answer is probably not. Our PTSD? The answer is probably not. Our studies, for example, showed a threefold studies, for example, showed a threefold increase in the rate of PTSD in sick veterans increase in the rate of PTSD in sick veterans of the 1991 Gulf War, but only from 1% to of the 1991 Gulf War, but only from 1% to 3% (Ismail 3% (Ismail et al et al, 2002) . This is a significant , 2002). This is a significant increase, but it remains the case that 97% increase, but it remains the case that 97% of the unwell group did not fulfil criteria of the unwell group did not fulfil criteria for PTSD. Clearly this is nothing like for PTSD. Clearly this is nothing like enough to explain the substantial increase enough to explain the substantial increase in subjective ill health that we and others in subjective ill health that we and others have confirmed in the aftermath of that have confirmed in the aftermath of that conflict (Unwin conflict (Unwin et al et al, 1999) . Nor is PTSD , 1999). Nor is PTSD even the main mental health problem facing even the main mental health problem facing the armed forces -depression and alcohol the armed forces -depression and alcohol misuse are more common (Rona misuse are more common (Rona et al et al, , 2004) . I suspect that future research will 2004). I suspect that future research will suggest that overstretch and the increasing suggest that overstretch and the increasing number of deployments, with their adverse number of deployments, with their adverse effect on family life and well-being, will be effect on family life and well-being, will be a more potent cause of mental health a more potent cause of mental health problems than conventional psychiatric problems than conventional psychiatric injury. Likewise, alcohol culture and availinjury. Likewise, alcohol culture and availability may pose more problems than ability may pose more problems than PTSD.
PTSD.
Yet even if there has been no real epiYet even if there has been no real epidemic of PTSD in the British armed forces, demic of PTSD in the British armed forces, reading the media might suggest otherwise, reading the media might suggest otherwise, and there has certainly been an epidemic of and there has certainly been an epidemic of stories about PTSD. The Vietnam veteran stories about PTSD. The Vietnam veteran story did play a significant part in one story did play a significant part in one established fact -the reawakening of interestablished fact -the reawakening of interest in trauma and its psychological conseest in trauma and its psychological consequences across Western society. However, quences across Western society. However, Vietnam was not the only reason for this. Vietnam was not the only reason for this. As social commentators never tire of telling As social commentators never tire of telling us, the 1960s was marked by major shifts in us, the 1960s was marked by major shifts in social values. One of the key changes relesocial values. One of the key changes relevant to our story is the shift from the comvant to our story is the shift from the community or group values that had shaped the munity or group values that had shaped the war years to a society that increasingly war years to a society that increasingly valued the individual over the group. Views valued the individual over the group. Views as to how one should emotionally deal with as to how one should emotionally deal with adversity also changed -from a belief in adversity also changed -from a belief in the importance of reticence and emotional the importance of reticence and emotional restraint, to one that encouraged emotional restraint, to one that encouraged emotional expression. expression.
There is no simple right or wrong There is no simple right or wrong answer as to how we should manage our answer as to how we should manage our emotions. Emotional responses, like everyemotions. Emotional responses, like everything else, are subject to fashion, and thing else, are subject to fashion, and fashions change. During the 1960s and fashions change. During the 1960s and beyond, the beyond, the 'stiff upper lip' was satirised 'stiff upper lip' was satirised by by Beyond the Fringe Beyond the Fringe and Monty Python, and Monty Python, whereas more recently emotional expreswhereas more recently emotional expression has been encouraged and rewarded, sion has been encouraged and rewarded, until we reach the until we reach the reductio ad absurdum reductio ad absurdum of Jerry Springer and the talk-show culture. of Jerry Springer and the talk-show culture. Talking about yourself, and the bad things Talking about yourself, and the bad things that may have happened to you, is now that may have happened to you, is now the fashion . the fashion .
Some have claimed that trauma and its Some have claimed that trauma and its consequences have become more common consequences have become more common because of the changing nature of modern because of the changing nature of modern life, but this seems unlikely. What has life, but this seems unlikely. What has happened has been a widening of the happened has been a widening of the boundaries of psychiatric injury. In its initiboundaries of psychiatric injury. In its initial formulation PTSD could only be diagal formulation PTSD could only be diagnosed after situations that were genuinely nosed after situations that were genuinely threatening to life and limb, but with every threatening to life and limb, but with every further iteration of the diagnostic criteria, further iteration of the diagnostic criteria, this has been broadened to include situathis has been broadened to include situations where people felt that they were in tions where people felt that they were in peril, even if they were not, and, finally, peril, even if they were not, and, finally, to any adverse experience, which can to any adverse experience, which can include viewing the attack on the New include viewing the attack on the New York World Trade Center on television, York World Trade Center on television, receiving a medical diagnosis or even receiving a medical diagnosis or even normal experiences such as childbirth. The normal experiences such as childbirth. The diagnostic label of PTSD has become a diagnostic label of PTSD has become a shorthand for all distress, and as it has shorthand for all distress, and as it has moved from its initial rigorous formulation moved from its initial rigorous formulation in the military context into the civilian secin the military context into the civilian sector it has become inflated. We may not face tor it has become inflated. We may not face an epidemic of PTSD, but we have experian epidemic of PTSD, but we have experienced an epidemic of stories about it. In enced an epidemic of stories about it. In consequence we all have our favourite consequence we all have our favourite 'stupid stress stories', reported with glee 'stupid stress stories', reported with glee by the right-wing media. Damages for by the right-wing media. Damages for post-traumatic stress have been received post-traumatic stress have been received for the trauma of receiving a strippagram, for the trauma of receiving a strippagram, spilling tea ( spilling tea (Daily Mail Daily Mail, 4 November , 4 November 1998), watching a stranger have an epilep-1998), watching a stranger have an epileptic fit in the street ( tic fit in the street (Daily Telegraph Daily Telegraph, 9 , 9 September 2002) or owning a 'mentally September 2002) or owning a 'mentally stressed' racehorse ( stressed' racehorse (Daily Mail Daily Mail, 6 July , 6 July 2002) -and many more. These stories can 2002) -and many more. These stories can be amusing, and serve as grist to the mill be amusing, and serve as grist to the mill of the anti-political-correctness lobby. But of the anti-political-correctness lobby. But they are also harmful, because they devalue they are also harmful, because they devalue the real narratives of PTSD such as that the real narratives of PTSD such as that experienced by Falklands veteran Simon experienced by Falklands veteran Simon Weston, who has movingly described his Weston, who has movingly described his struggles to come to terms with not just struggles to come to terms with not just his physical disability, but his psychological his physical disability, but his psychological scars as well. Hence these silly 'I tripped scars as well. Hence these silly 'I tripped over a paving stone and am now suing for over a paving stone and am now suing for PTSD' stories inadvertently trivialise the PTSD' stories inadvertently trivialise the genuine stories of psychiatric distress and genuine stories of psychiatric distress and disorder. The inflation of PTSD has led to disorder. The inflation of PTSD has led to its increased acceptance by society, but as its increased acceptance by society, but as Chancellors of the Exchequer are always Chancellors of the Exchequer are always telling us, inflation leads to devaluation. telling us, inflation leads to devaluation.
PTSD AND THE MYTHS PTSD AND THE MYTHS OF PREVENTION OF PREVENTION
The seductions of screening The seductions of screening Even if it is not as common as some believe, Even if it is not as common as some believe, PTSD (like all psychiatric disorders) is bad PTSD (like all psychiatric disorders) is bad news if you develop it. Because it seems news if you develop it. Because it seems so obvious that prevention is better than so obvious that prevention is better than cure, the cry for better prevention has gone cure, the cry for better prevention has gone up after every conflict of the past century. up after every conflict of the past century. Perhaps the most appealing strategy inPerhaps the most appealing strategy involves screening those at risk before they volves screening those at risk before they are exposed to adversity. If we could know are exposed to adversity. If we could know who was going to break down in battle, we who was going to break down in battle, we could screen them out beforehand. This could screen them out beforehand. This would give us a stronger military, and be would give us a stronger military, and be better for the service men and women better for the service men and women themthemselves, their families and the Chancellor. The selves, their families and the Chancellor. The historical record is indeed full of pleas historical record is indeed full of pleas made by those having to command men in made by those having to command men in battle to those responsible for selection imbattle to those responsible for selection imploring them to do a better job (Jones, E., ploring them to do a better job (Jones, E., et al et al, 2003) . My favourite is quoted in , 2003). My favourite is quoted in Ben Shephard's classic account of psychiaBen Shephard's classic account of psychiatrists at war , and is a trists at war , and is a signal sent by a senior officer in the Eighth signal sent by a senior officer in the Eighth Army in Egypt in 1942 back to the War Army in Egypt in 1942 back to the War Office, begging them not to send him men Office, begging them not to send him men who 'can't stand the brothels of Cairo, let who 'can't stand the brothels of Cairo, let alone the Afrika Korp'. alone the Afrika Korp'.
One answer seems to be mass psycholoOne answer seems to be mass psychological screening. Back in the Second World gical screening. Back in the Second World War, the Americans -as optimistic then War, the Americans -as optimistic then as they are now -believed that they could as they are now -believed that they could identify those who were going to make identify those who were going to make bad soldiers and future psychiatric cases. bad soldiers and future psychiatric cases. They enlisted the enthusiastic help of the They enlisted the enthusiastic help of the best psychiatrists in the land, led by Harry best psychiatrists in the land, led by Harry Stack Sullivan, one of the most famous psyStack Sullivan, one of the most famous psychiatrists of the mid-20th century. The psychiatrists of the mid-20th century. The psychiatrists gave their all for the war effort, chiatrists gave their all for the war effort, removing over 2 million men from the draft removing over 2 million men from the draft on the basis of personality testing that preon the basis of personality testing that predicted future breakdown (Jones, E., dicted future breakdown (Jones, E., et al et al, , 2003) . However, the Americans nearly lost 2003). However, the Americans nearly lost the war in consequence. By 1944, when no the war in consequence. By 1944, when no less a person than George C. Marshall less a person than George C. Marshall called a halt, they were running out of men called a halt, they were running out of men . What then happened . What then happened was that many of those previously rejected was that many of those previously rejected on psychiatric grounds were enlisted -a on psychiatric grounds were enlisted -a vast natural experiment. To everyone's vast natural experiment. To everyone's surprise, studies showed that most made surprise, studies showed that most made perfectly good soldiers. Some broke down, perfectly good soldiers. Some broke down, proportionately more than those who had proportionately more than those who had not been screened out -the psychiatrists not been screened out -the psychiatrists were were not totally wrong -but up to 85% not totally wrong -but up to 85% made perfectly adequate soldiers (Aita, made perfectly adequate soldiers ).
There were many reasons why screenThere were many reasons why screening for psychological vulnerability to breaking for psychological vulnerability to breakdown before deployment failed then, down before deployment failed then, reasons which remain fundamentally unreasons which remain fundamentally unchanged to the present day. A major risk changed to the present day. A major risk factor for breakdown is experiencing a factor for breakdown is experiencing a traumatic event -but that has not yet traumatic event -but that has not yet happened (and may never do so), so prehappened (and may never do so), so predeployment screening is deprived of the deployment screening is deprived of the best single predictive factor. What remains best single predictive factor. What remains is a collection of risk factors, which is a collection of risk factors, which although statistically significant are all although statistically significant are all relatively weak individual predictors of relatively weak individual predictors of future breakdown (Brewin future breakdown . , 2000). Furthermore, excluding people who have Furthermore, excluding people who have these risk factors (coming from a singlethese risk factors (coming from a singleparent family, having a family history of parent family, having a family history of psychiatric disorder, a poor school record psychiatric disorder, a poor school record and so on) would have many untoward and so on) would have many untoward consequences. Denying military service to consequences. Denying military service to people with these risky backgrounds, for people with these risky backgrounds, for example, would clearly have a serious effect example, would clearly have a serious effect on recruitment, especially for the army, on recruitment, especially for the army, which traditionally recruits from areas of which traditionally recruits from areas of social disadvantage. It would also deny social disadvantage. It would also deny some of the social goals and benefits of some of the social goals and benefits of military service -giving people from disadmilitary service -giving people from disadvantaged backgrounds a chance to learn a vantaged backgrounds a chance to learn a skill, and gain self-respect. skill, and gain self-respect.
Labelling people as potentially psychoLabelling people as potentially psychologically unstable, before anything has logically unstable, before anything has happened to prove that label correct, is also happened to prove that label correct, is also not without risks. It changes people's views not without risks. It changes people's views of themselves in unpredictable ways, and of themselves in unpredictable ways, and exposes them to stigma. The American exposes them to stigma. The American experience showed that some denied the experience showed that some denied the opportunity to serve their country because opportunity to serve their country because of concerns for their psychological stability of concerns for their psychological stability returned to their home communities and returned to their home communities and were exposed to shame and ridicule. were exposed to shame and ridicule.
In conclusion, the case for psychoIn conclusion, the case for psychological screening is difficult to make. It is logical screening is difficult to make. It is hard to see how a psychological screening hard to see how a psychological screening programme for the armed forces could programme for the armed forces could ever fulfil the criteria that the ever fulfil the criteria that the National Health Service (NHS) insists upon National Health Service (NHS) insists upon before introducing before introducing any new screening any new screening programme, and indeed, in the recent programme, and indeed, in the recent seminal PTSD judgment in favour of the seminal PTSD judgment in favour of the Ministry of Defence, Mr Justice Owen came Ministry of Defence, Mr Justice Owen came to the same conclusion (Multiple Claimants to the same conclusion (Multiple Claimants v. v. The Ministry of Defence, 2003) .
The Ministry of Defence, 2003) . Nevertheless, as I write, voices are Nevertheless, as I write, voices are again raised calling for psychological again raised calling for psychological screening in the military. This time it is screening in the military. This time it is not to prevent breakdown in battle, but to not to prevent breakdown in battle, but to prevent suicide during military service. prevent suicide during military service. However, the arguments against this are, However, the arguments against this are, if anything, even more compelling than if anything, even more compelling than the arguments against screening to prevent the arguments against screening to prevent breakdown after battle. Suicide during milibreakdown after battle. Suicide during military service is rare, and like all rare events, tary service is rare, and like all rare events, almost impossible to predict. Once again, it almost impossible to predict. Once again, it is loosely associated with variables indicatis loosely associated with variables indicating social disadvantage that are common in ing social disadvantage that are common in military recruits. A major risk factor not military recruits. A major risk factor not amenable to screening is also the availability amenable to screening is also the availability within the military of the means of suicidewithin the military of the means of suicidefirearms. Rather than concentrating on firearms. Rather than concentrating on excluding people from risky backgrounds excluding people from risky backgrounds from joining the armed forces, a more from joining the armed forces, a more sensible strategy might be to increase the sensible strategy might be to increase the support they receive in service. support they receive in service.
The disappointments of debriefing The disappointments of debriefing
If screening does not work, there is still If screening does not work, there is still much that can be done to reduce the risk much that can be done to reduce the risk of psychiatric breakdown before people go of psychiatric breakdown before people go into battle. Men fight for their friends, into battle. Men fight for their friends, and the best protectors against breakdown and the best protectors against breakdown in battle are group cohesion and bonding in battle are group cohesion and bonding Palmer, 2003) . Palmer, 2003) . Issues such as morale, leadership, good Issues such as morale, leadership, good equipment and training are all relevant. equipment and training are all relevant. None of this is news, and little of it has None of this is news, and little of it has much to do with psychiatry. But what much to do with psychiatry. But what about after deployment, after people have about after deployment, after people have been exposed to unpleasant sights or danbeen exposed to unpleasant sights or dangerous situations? Just as with screening, gerous situations? Just as with screening, the idea that immediate psychological interthe idea that immediate psychological interventions could prevent later breakdown ventions could prevent later breakdown sounds intuitively appealing, and has had sounds intuitively appealing, and has had numerous supporters over the years. Hownumerous supporters over the years. However, just as the negative experiences of psyever, just as the negative experiences of psychological screening during the Second chological screening during the Second World War should give us pause for World War should give us pause for thought, we have the example of psycholothought, we have the example of psychological debriefing to provide us with another gical debriefing to provide us with another cautionary tale. cautionary tale.
Most people will be familiar with the Most people will be familiar with the concept of single-session psychological concept of single-session psychological debriefing. This is an intervention led by a debriefing. This is an intervention led by a mental health professional carried out with mental health professional carried out with people (individually or in groups) shortly people (individually or in groups) shortly after they have been exposed to some form after they have been exposed to some form of adversity. The procedure involves some of adversity. The procedure involves some element of telling the story of the event, element of telling the story of the event, asking how people felt emotionally during asking how people felt emotionally during the event and now, and teaching about the event and now, and teaching about likely further emotional reactions over likely further emotional reactions over time. Its purpose, enthusiastically protime. Its purpose, enthusiastically proclaimed by its protagonists, is to prevent claimed by its protagonists, is to prevent later psychiatric disorder such as PTSD. later psychiatric disorder such as PTSD.
In our contemporary culture, the arrival In our contemporary culture, the arrival of what the media inevitably call 'trained of what the media inevitably call 'trained counsellors' has become as much a part of counsellors' has become as much a part of the theatre of disaster as that of the emerthe theatre of disaster as that of the emergency services. It has become part of the gency services. It has become part of the social recognition of disaster, and our social recognition of disaster, and our collective desire that 'something must be collective desire that 'something must be done' . The problem is that to done' . The problem is that to date, research has failed to show any date, research has failed to show any benefit from single-session psychological benefit from single-session psychological debriefing (Wessely & Deahl, 2003) , and debriefing (Wessely & Deahl, 2003) , and indeed there is evidence that it may increase indeed there is evidence that it may increase the risk of subsequent psychological disorthe risk of subsequent psychological disorder (Emmerik der (Emmerik et al et al, 2002) . There are , 2002). There are many reasons for the ineffectiveness and many reasons for the ineffectiveness and possible adverse effects of debriefing. I possible adverse effects of debriefing. I favour the view that it impedes the normal favour the view that it impedes the normal ways in which we deal with adversityways in which we deal with adversitytalking to our friends, family, general talking to our friends, family, general practitioner, the padre and so on -and practitioner, the padre and so on -and instead professionalises distress. instead professionalises distress.
So the debriefing saga is a warning So the debriefing saga is a warning against naıve efforts that we can preventagainst naïve efforts that we can preventand I emphasise the word 'prevent' -the and I emphasise the word 'prevent' -the psychological consequences of trauma. Prepsychological consequences of trauma. Prevention, as opposed to treatment, does not vention, as opposed to treatment, does not work. work.
So to conclude about psychiatric injury So to conclude about psychiatric injury and risk: the only certain way of preventing and risk: the only certain way of preventing PTSD and psychiatric injury is by not send-PTSD and psychiatric injury is by not sending people to war. All else is speculative, ing people to war. All else is speculative, uncertain or even erroneous. When people uncertain or even erroneous. When people do develop psychiatric disorders, however, do develop psychiatric disorders, however, we can and should do better -I use the we can and should do better -I use the word 'we' advisedly, since as shown by word 'we' advisedly, since as shown by Contrary to the views in some quarters, Contrary to the views in some quarters, it is wrong to say that the military know it is wrong to say that the military know nothing and do nothing about psychiatric nothing and do nothing about psychiatric injury. The military have an enviable record injury. The military have an enviable record for innovation in psychiatry -it was for innovation in psychiatry -it was military psychiatry that initiated group military psychiatry that initiated group psychotherapy (Harrison & Clarke, 1992) . psychotherapy (Harrison & Clarke, 1992) . Likewise, modern community care and Likewise, modern community care and assertive outreach began with the military assertive outreach began with the military doctrine of 'proximity, immediacy and doctrine of 'proximity, immediacy and expectancy' that is the standard manageexpectancy' that is the standard management of combat stress, and gave the ment of combat stress, and gave the intellectual stimulus to crisis intervention intellectual stimulus to crisis intervention (Artiss, 1997 
THE SYNDROMES THE SYNDROMES ARE COMING ARE COMING
If psychiatric injury is, to coin a phrase, If psychiatric injury is, to coin a phrase, nothing to be afraid of, the same is not true nothing to be afraid of, the same is not true of my next examples. This is the area of risk of my next examples. This is the area of risk that really does at times appear inexplicable that really does at times appear inexplicable and baffling. It is the world of unexplained and baffling. It is the world of unexplained symptoms and syndromes, exemplified in symptoms and syndromes, exemplified in the military context by the story of the the military context by the story of the so-called Gulf War syndrome (Wessely, so-called Gulf War syndrome (Wessely, 2001 ) (The term 'Gulf War syndrome' is 2001) (The term 'Gulf War syndrome' is strictly speaking a misnomer, since there is strictly speaking a misnomer, since there is no compelling evidence of a constellation no compelling evidence of a constellation of signs or symptoms uniquely associated of signs or symptoms uniquely associated with Gulf service. The correct term should with Gulf service. The correct term should be 'Gulf War illness' or 'Gulf War illnesses', be 'Gulf War illness' or 'Gulf War illnesses', but it is 'Gulf War syndrome' that has but it is 'Gulf War syndrome' that has entered the lexicon.) Some time after the entered the lexicon.) Some time after the end of hostilities in the 1991 Gulf War, end of hostilities in the 1991 Gulf War, reports started to emerge in the USA, and reports started to emerge in the USA, and subsequently the UK, of service men and subsequently the UK, of service men and women coming forward with inexplicable women coming forward with inexplicable health complaints. These did not constitute health complaints. These did not constitute any recognised condition in medical any recognised condition in medical science, but were instead a collection of science, but were instead a collection of diverse symptoms such as overwhelming diverse symptoms such as overwhelming fatigue, concentration difficulties, generalfatigue, concentration difficulties, generalised pain and malaise, problems with ised pain and malaise, problems with memory and many others. At the same time memory and many others. At the same time Gulf veterans who had fathered children Gulf veterans who had fathered children with congenital disabilities also blamed this with congenital disabilities also blamed this on their military service. Numerous causes on their military service. Numerous causes were advanced in the media, ranging from were advanced in the media, ranging from smoke from oil fires, use of pesticides, smoke from oil fires, use of pesticides, exposure to depleted uranium, new infecexposure to depleted uranium, new infections, reactions to the vaccination protions, reactions to the vaccination programmes used to protect against biological grammes used to protect against biological warfare, medications given to protect warfare, medications given to protect against chemical warfare, and even against chemical warfare, and even exposure to nerve agents themselves. exposure to nerve agents themselves. This is not the place to analyse the growThis is not the place to analyse the growing literature on Gulf War illness (see Barrett ing literature on Gulf War illness (see Barrett et al et al, 2003) . However, it is fair to say that , 2003). However, it is fair to say that no single cause, and no pathological process, no single cause, and no pathological process, has been found to explain the problem, and has been found to explain the problem, and problem it undoubtedly is. Up to 20% of problem it undoubtedly is. Up to 20% of the UK armed forces deployed to the Gulf the UK armed forces deployed to the Gulf have increased health complaints, and have increased health complaints, and similar numbers believe themselves victim similar numbers believe themselves victim of this mysterious syndrome (Chalder of this mysterious syndrome (Chalder et al et al, , 2001; Cherry 2001; Cherry et al et al, 2001 
RISKS : PERCEPTIONS RISKS : PERCEPTIONS AND PAR ADOXES AND PAR ADOXES
New syndromes such as those described New syndromes such as those described above make a little more sense if we above make a little more sense if we consider the question of contemporary consider the question of contemporary health concerns, and the explanations that health concerns, and the explanations that people give for illness. The health concerns people give for illness. The health concerns of the public are not the same as the health of the public are not the same as the health concerns of doctors and scientists. As good concerns of doctors and scientists. As good doctors, we try hard to convince people not doctors, we try hard to convince people not to smoke, to drink less, drive more slowly to smoke, to drink less, drive more slowly and eat more vegetables, but it is an uphill and eat more vegetables, but it is an uphill struggle. Public health physicians plod on, struggle. Public health physicians plod on, because they know these are the real risks because they know these are the real risks to health and survival. Sadly, the public reto health and survival. Sadly, the public remains fairly unwilling to do much about it, mains fairly unwilling to do much about it, and rather unconcerned when all is said and and rather unconcerned when all is said and done. None of this is surprising, because the done. None of this is surprising, because the public does not rate risks in the same statispublic does not rate risks in the same statistical way scientists do. For a scientist, tical way scientists do. For a scientist, something that kills 100 people is twice as something that kills 100 people is twice as risky as something that kills 50 people a risky as something that kills 50 people a year; is twice as dangerous, twice as bad. year; is twice as dangerous, twice as bad. This is simple, statistical, and almost comThis is simple, statistical, and almost completely misses the point. The public judge pletely misses the point. The public judge risk by other criteria, in which statistics risk by other criteria, in which statistics play a relatively small part. For example, play a relatively small part. For example, did I accept the risk voluntarily, when I did I accept the risk voluntarily, when I chose to smoke or drive too fast, or was it chose to smoke or drive too fast, or was it outside my control? Invisible risksoutside my control? Invisible risksviruses, chemicals, radiation -are more viruses, chemicals, radiation -are more scary than visible ones, and are associated scary than visible ones, and are associated with particular dread. Unnatural risks with particular dread. Unnatural risks rate higher than natural ones: although rate higher than natural ones: although many people have died in the UK -let many people have died in the UK -let alone the world -from floods, far more alone the world -from floods, far more column inches and campaign hours are column inches and campaign hours are devoted to the threat from nuclear power devoted to the threat from nuclear power stations, yet to cause a single death in the stations, yet to cause a single death in the UK. UK.
People are almost more prepared to People are almost more prepared to accept risks if they also perceive some indiaccept risks if they also perceive some individual benefit to themselves from taking vidual benefit to themselves from taking that risk. In Britain, the government has that risk. In Britain, the government has been unable to persuade the public that been unable to persuade the public that genetically modified foods offer any benefit genetically modified foods offer any benefit to our society (as opposed to developing to our society (as opposed to developing countries). In contrast, despite all the media countries). In contrast, despite all the media attempts to generate mobile telephone attempts to generate mobile telephone scares, people still accept this risk (if there scares, people still accept this risk (if there is one) because the benefits are so obvious. is one) because the benefits are so obvious. Hence we have the strange situation of Hence we have the strange situation of the Stewart Committee concluding that the Stewart Committee concluding that although there was no evidence that mobile although there was no evidence that mobile phones were a health hazard, they recomphones were a health hazard, they recommended restricting use by children 'as a mended restricting use by children 'as a precaution' (Independent Expert Group on precaution' (Independent Expert Group on Mobile Phones, 2000). As anyone with Mobile Phones, 2000). As anyone with adolescent children will know, never was adolescent children will know, never was government advice so openly ignored. government advice so openly ignored.
People worry about risks because of People worry about risks because of factors other than statistics. In the UK, it factors other than statistics. In the UK, it is not smoking, obesity, poor diet, speeding is not smoking, obesity, poor diet, speeding and lack of exercise that are associated with and lack of exercise that are associated with popular concerns and outrage. It is issues popular concerns and outrage. It is issues such as landfill sites, chemicals, food addisuch as landfill sites, chemicals, food additives, silicone breast implants, dental tives, silicone breast implants, dental amalgam, low-level radiation, childhood amalgam, low-level radiation, childhood inoculations and so on. These are the risks, inoculations and so on. These are the risks, some of them more virtual than real, that some of them more virtual than real, that make the media excited, the public worried make the media excited, the public worried and the politicians perplexed. and the politicians perplexed.
All of this matters. People's appraisals All of this matters. People's appraisals of risks, their concerns, directly affect their of risks, their concerns, directly affect their health. We know that the greater the degree health. We know that the greater the degree of worry shown by a person about the of worry shown by a person about the potential effects of, for example, living near potential effects of, for example, living near a landfill site, the greater the number of a landfill site, the greater the number of symptoms (Roht symptoms (Roht et al et al, 1985) . There is also , 1985). There is also compelling evidence from a prospective compelling evidence from a prospective New Zealand study led by psychologist New Zealand study led by psychologist Keith Petrie (Petrie Keith Petrie (Petrie et al et al, 2005) . He had , 2005). He had advance warning of a plan to eliminate a advance warning of a plan to eliminate a particular pest, the painted apple moth, by particular pest, the painted apple moth, by spraying some Auckland suburbs with spraying some Auckland suburbs with pesticide. Before this could take place, he pesticide. Before this could take place, he asked a large sample of residents about asked a large sample of residents about their particular concerns about health and their particular concerns about health and the environment. The spraying then took the environment. The spraying then took place, and he repeated the study, looking place, and he repeated the study, looking at how people had been affected by the at how people had been affected by the spray. What he found was that the more spray. What he found was that the more people registered concerns about, for exampeople registered concerns about, for example, genetically modified food, mobile ple, genetically modified food, mobile phone masts or food additives before the phone masts or food additives before the spray, the more they reported symptoms spray, the more they reported symptoms afterwards. They even reported more health afterwards. They even reported more health problems in their pets. So what we think of problems in their pets. So what we think of our environment, and the explanations we our environment, and the explanations we give for our symptoms, matter, and affect give for our symptoms, matter, and affect how we will react when exposed to these how we will react when exposed to these agents. Remember, if the effects of the agents. Remember, if the effects of the pesticides were solely toxicological, then pesticides were solely toxicological, then beliefs should not make a difference. Once beliefs should not make a difference. Once you have taken the decision to smoke, your you have taken the decision to smoke, your risk of developing cancer is unaffected by risk of developing cancer is unaffected by your views on the link between smoking your views on the link between smoking and cancer, nor by the fact that your Uncle and cancer, nor by the fact that your Uncle Albert smoked 60 a day and still reached Albert smoked 60 a day and still reached his 100th birthday. his 100th birthday.
None of this is surprising. Much of the None of this is surprising. Much of the public share concerns about the quality of public share concerns about the quality of our food, water and air. Many support our food, water and air. Many support the efforts of organisations, especially the efforts of organisations, especially non-governmental organisations, to improve non-governmental organisations, to improve our environment. Many share the views of our environment. Many share the views of the same organisations about the links the same organisations about the links between our environment and health. But between our environment and health. But taken overall, and in historical context, it taken overall, and in historical context, it seems baffling, and paradoxical. In Westerseems baffling, and paradoxical. In Westernised countries we now live longer and are nised countries we now live longer and are healthier than in any other period of human healthier than in any other period of human history. Our environment, be it the air we history. Our environment, be it the air we breathe, the food we eat or the water we breathe, the food we eat or the water we drink, has little relationship to that of a drink, has little relationship to that of a hundred years ago, testament to a century hundred years ago, testament to a century of extraordinary successes in public health. of extraordinary successes in public health. Yet this is not reflected in self-rated health: Yet this is not reflected in self-rated health: we complain of more symptoms, spend we complain of more symptoms, spend more days in bed and rate our health as more days in bed and rate our health as worse than we did 40 years or even 80 worse than we did 40 years or even 80 years ago (Verbrugge, 1984; Shorter, years ago (Verbrugge, 1984; . This has been aptly described as 1992). This has been aptly described as the paradox of health (Barsky, 1988) . the paradox of health (Barsky, 1988) .
Our current concerns with the quality Our current concerns with the quality of our food or water seem to have become of our food or water seem to have become disconnected from the real advances that disconnected from the real advances that have been made. Some idealists look back have been made. Some idealists look back nostalgically to a period when our food nostalgically to a period when our food was 'natural' and free from contamination, was 'natural' and free from contamination, before the rise of the food industry and before the rise of the food industry and mass farming; but any reading of classic mass farming; but any reading of classic descriptions of working-class life in London descriptions of working-class life in London or industrial Salford in the 19th century or industrial Salford in the 19th century would serve as an antidote to over-romantic would serve as an antidote to over-romantic readings of history. Back then our food, air readings of history. Back then our food, air and water really were toxic. Victorian food and water really were toxic. Victorian food was grossly contaminated -strychnine in was grossly contaminated -strychnine in rum, copper sulphate in pickles and prerum, copper sulphate in pickles and preserves, lead in mustard, ferrous sulphate serves, lead in mustard, ferrous sulphate in tea and beer, lead and mercury in sugar in tea and beer, lead and mercury in sugar and chocolate. A and chocolate. A Punch Punch cartoon in 1855 cartoon in 1855 shows a little girl approaching a grocer shows a little girl approaching a grocer and saying, 'If you please, sir, mother and saying, 'If you please, sir, mother would like a pound of tea to kill the rats would like a pound of tea to kill the rats with, and an ounce of chocolate to get rid with, and an ounce of chocolate to get rid of the beetles' (Dalrymple, 1998) . of the beetles' (Dalrymple, 1998) .
So the undeniable changes in all objecSo the undeniable changes in all objective indices of health do not seem to have tive indices of health do not seem to have been mirrored in a collective increase in been mirrored in a collective increase in subjective health and well-being -rather subjective health and well-being -rather the opposite. The increased tempo of the opposite. The increased tempo of regulation exemplified by the 'precautionregulation exemplified by the 'precautionary principle' has not been reflected in ary principle' has not been reflected in increased public well-being, confidence or increased public well-being, confidence or reassurance. Instead, as numerous comreassurance. Instead, as numerous commentators have noted, excessive regulation, mentators have noted, excessive regulation, coupled with a media that seems to thrive coupled with a media that seems to thrive on a diet of health-scare stories, leads to on a diet of health-scare stories, leads to the danger that we are worrying ourselves the danger that we are worrying ourselves sick. sick.
THE MILITARY: ACCEPTABLE THE MILITARY: ACCEPTABLE AND NON-ACCEPTABLE AND NON-ACCEPTABLE RISKS RISKS
So far I have been considering the position So far I have been considering the position for civilian society, but there is little reason for civilian society, but there is little reason to suspect that things are different for the to suspect that things are different for the military. We know that the military do military. We know that the military do accept certain risks and hazards for which accept certain risks and hazards for which they see a purpose -serving members of they see a purpose -serving members of the armed forces make it clear that they the armed forces make it clear that they accept the risks of war that go with the accept the risks of war that go with the job, and hence the chance of physical and job, and hence the chance of physical and even psychological injury. Like civilians, even psychological injury. Like civilians, the military seem accepting of other risks the military seem accepting of other risks over which they feel they have a choiceover which they feel they have a choicesuch as driving or sports injuries, a perensuch as driving or sports injuries, a perennial cause of serious injury and staffing nial cause of serious injury and staffing difficulties. These types of risk are clear, difficulties. These types of risk are clear, and associated with a greater burden of and associated with a greater burden of morbidity and mortality than any of the morbidity and mortality than any of the hazards that have been linked with (for hazards that have been linked with (for example) Gulf War syndrome, yet it is the example) Gulf War syndrome, yet it is the latter that dominates the media columns. latter that dominates the media columns.
I suggest four possible reasons for this. I suggest four possible reasons for this. First, these risks are similar to those that First, these risks are similar to those that are already known from the civilian literaare already known from the civilian literature to score high on the measures of risk ture to score high on the measures of risk perception already considered. Second, perception already considered. Second, these apparently new risks are not seen as these apparently new risks are not seen as part of the traditional military contract. part of the traditional military contract. Third, there are questions about fairness Third, there are questions about fairness and equity. Finally, we cannot ignore the and equity. Finally, we cannot ignore the growing problem of mistrust of all institugrowing problem of mistrust of all institutions, particularly those with military tions, particularly those with military connections. connections.
The first reason that might help us to The first reason that might help us to understand the emergence of 'Gulf War understand the emergence of 'Gulf War syndrome' is the link between the potential syndrome' is the link between the potential hazards blamed for the syndrome and the hazards blamed for the syndrome and the health concerns of non-military populahealth concerns of non-military populations. Concerns about the effect of smoke tions. Concerns about the effect of smoke from the oil fires burning in Kuwait, even from the oil fires burning in Kuwait, even though these have not been substantiated, though these have not been substantiated, may relate to civilian concerns about air may relate to civilian concerns about air pollution and quality. ) ) and the beginnings of the ecology moveand the beginnings of the ecology movement. Given the continuing crisis in the ment. Given the continuing crisis in the UK over the measles, mumps and rubella UK over the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine, one does not need to (MMR) vaccine, one does not need to labour the overlap between civilian and mililabour the overlap between civilian and military concerns about vaccination. Another tary concerns about vaccination. Another source of anxiety and column inches is the source of anxiety and column inches is the use of depleted uranium munitions. The use of depleted uranium munitions. The main hazard of exposure (assuming that main hazard of exposure (assuming that one survives the actual impact) comes not one survives the actual impact) comes not from its modest radioactive properties but from its modest radioactive properties but because it is a heavy metal. The risks from because it is a heavy metal. The risks from depleted uranium fragments are closer to depleted uranium fragments are closer to those from lead rather than plutonium those from lead rather than plutonium (Fulco (Fulco et al et al, 2000) . Instead, the reason for , 2000). Instead, the reason for the high level of public and media concern the high level of public and media concern may come not from its properties as a may come not from its properties as a heavy metal, but its lexical links to heavy metal, but its lexical links to radiation, conjuring up images of radiation, conjuring up images of Hiroshima and Chernobyl, and thus scorHiroshima and Chernobyl, and thus scoring as high as one can get on measures of ing as high as one can get on measures of risk perception. risk perception.
There is a second reason why the miliThere is a second reason why the military find these hazards so problematic. tary find these hazards so problematic. Those 'toxic' risks are not what service Those 'toxic' risks are not what service men and women signed up for; and it is men and women signed up for; and it is worse if these risks appear to be selfworse if these risks appear to be selfinflicted -hence the anxiety and distrust inflicted -hence the anxiety and distrust over the use of medical countermeasures over the use of medical countermeasures such as pyridostigmine or biowarfare vacsuch as pyridostigmine or biowarfare vaccinations, or alternatively from the sidecinations, or alternatively from the sideeffects of our use of depleted uranium effects of our use of depleted uranium munitions. These are the medical equivamunitions. These are the medical equivalents of 'friendly fire', itself an emotive issue lents of 'friendly fire', itself an emotive issue with great resonance for the armed forces. with great resonance for the armed forces.
Third, we already know that risk Third, we already know that risk perception and tolerance are linked to quesperception and tolerance are linked to questions of equity. Risks that are equally tions of equity. Risks that are equally distributed across the population are seen distributed across the population are seen as less problematic than those that affect a as less problematic than those that affect a small group, especially if that group is seen small group, especially if that group is seen as disadvantaged. During the 2001 anthrax as disadvantaged. During the 2001 anthrax crisis in Washington, DC, there was a crisis in Washington, DC, there was a perception that officials reacted more perception that officials reacted more vigorously to the threat to Congress than vigorously to the threat to Congress than to the threat to the postal workers, who to the threat to the postal workers, who were more likely to come from disadvanwere more likely to come from disadvantaged ethnic minorities. The consequences taged ethnic minorities. The consequences of that misjudgement are still being felt. of that misjudgement are still being felt. Turning to the military, no longer do the Turning to the military, no longer do the UK and the USA have citizen armies, based UK and the USA have citizen armies, based on national service or conscription. Conseon national service or conscription. Consequently, both the British and American quently, both the British and American militaries contain an overrepresentation of militaries contain an overrepresentation of those from disadvantaged backgrounds those from disadvantaged backgrounds and regions of the country. This is in and regions of the country. This is in contrast to the Second World War, when contrast to the Second World War, when one could argue that all social classes were one could argue that all social classes were equally exposed to danger, both in the miliequally exposed to danger, both in the military and in the civilian sector. What is striktary and in the civilian sector. What is striking about the seminal long-term studies of ing about the seminal long-term studies of the outcome of combat performed by the outcome of combat performed by George Vaillant on the Harvard class of George Vaillant on the Harvard class of 1942 (Lee 1942 (Lee et al et al, 1995 is that nearly all of , 1995) is that nearly all of that undergraduate class, that undergraduate class, drawn from the drawn from the most privileged in American society, joined most privileged in American society, joined the armed services, the armed services, and two-thirds of them and two-thirds of them served overseas, most seeing combat. The served overseas, most seeing combat. The lack of parallels with the present is clear. lack of parallels with the present is clear. Exposure to risk is no longer equitable. Exposure to risk is no longer equitable.
Finally, all of these narratives take Finally, all of these narratives take place in a society that has become less place in a society that has become less accepting of authority or expertise, and less accepting of authority or expertise, and less deferential. The legacy of episodes perdeferential. The legacy of episodes perceived to be examples of official denial or ceived to be examples of official denial or less than full disclosure, such as Agent less than full disclosure, such as Agent Orange or the side-effects of nuclear test Orange or the side-effects of nuclear test programmes in the 1950s, is that the public programmes in the 1950s, is that the public and the rank and file of the armed forces and the rank and file of the armed forces are less likely to accept official reassurance, are less likely to accept official reassurance, and more likely to believe information and more likely to believe information obtained from the internet, irrespective of obtained from the internet, irrespective of its scientific merit. This general loss of trust its scientific merit. This general loss of trust in institutions amplifies risk concerns and in institutions amplifies risk concerns and risk awareness across society . risk awareness across society .
RISKS : PROPORTIONAL RISKS : PROPORTIONAL AND NON-PROPORTIONAL AND NON-PROPORTIONAL
The military have little to be afraid of from The military have little to be afraid of from acknowledging the reality of psychiatric acknowledging the reality of psychiatric injury. Understanding it better, and acceptinjury. Understanding it better, and accepting it more sympathetically, poses no daning it more sympathetically, poses no danger to them, provided it is managed ger to them, provided it is managed within the context of military culture, and within the context of military culture, and that they do not heed the siren voices who that they do not heed the siren voices who claim that stress can be avoided or claim that stress can be avoided or prevented, as opposed to managed. The prevented, as opposed to managed. The Ministry of Defence fought and won the Ministry of Defence fought and won the massive PTSD legal case on the basis that massive PTSD legal case on the basis that it is utopian to believe that stress can ever it is utopian to believe that stress can ever be eliminated from a military organisation. be eliminated from a military organisation. Indeed, this is undesirable. The military Indeed, this is undesirable. The military deliberately stretch and test people because deliberately stretch and test people because war is a stressful business, and it is best to war is a stressful business, and it is best to come prepared. come prepared.
However, things are not perfect, and However, things are not perfect, and one thing the armed forces can do better one thing the armed forces can do better is to promote a climate in which people will is to promote a climate in which people will come forward and declare they are having come forward and declare they are having problems -stigma remains a serious issue. problems -stigma remains a serious issue. what may reduce their operational effectiveness, is the wider risk-averse tional effectiveness, is the wider risk-averse culture that is now so entrenched in the culture that is now so entrenched in the civilian world. We have as a society become civilian world. We have as a society become too risk-averse, terrified of our shadows, too risk-averse, terrified of our shadows, able to contemplate a measles epidemic that able to contemplate a measles epidemic that will kill children because of fears of a will kill children because of fears of a vaccine that does not. If the armed forces vaccine that does not. If the armed forces embrace a similar risk-averse culture, embrace a similar risk-averse culture, fuelled by rumour and anecdote, then the fuelled by rumour and anecdote, then the consequences could be as severe. This is consequences could be as severe. This is because there are fundamental differences because there are fundamental differences between the psychiatric and nonbetween the psychiatric and nonpsychiatric risks that I have been considerpsychiatric risks that I have been considering. Psychiatric injuries are proportionate ing. Psychiatric injuries are proportionate to risk, since there is some relationship to risk, since there is some relationship between exposure and outcome. Furtherbetween exposure and outcome. Furthermore, we have a reasonable, if not perfect, more, we have a reasonable, if not perfect, understanding of why psychiatric injury understanding of why psychiatric injury occurs, and some idea of what to do when occurs, and some idea of what to do when it does. But our new 'modern' risks, which it does. But our new 'modern' risks, which I have outlined above, are more difficult. I have outlined above, are more difficult. There are few simple links between There are few simple links between exposure and outcome, the mechanisms exposure and outcome, the mechanisms involved are either obscure or occasionally involved are either obscure or occasionally non-existent, and we have little idea of non-existent, and we have little idea of what to do about them. Indeed, because what to do about them. Indeed, because we do not understand these new risks, our we do not understand these new risks, our approach tends to be based on precaution, approach tends to be based on precaution, which may only further increase our which may only further increase our anxieties. anxieties.
The precautionary approach, which is The precautionary approach, which is currently the accepted doctrine for mancurrently the accepted doctrine for managing these small risks, seems to be failing. aging these small risks, seems to be failing. People do not appear to be reassured by People do not appear to be reassured by ever more draconian measures to reduce ever more draconian measures to reduce ever-smaller risks. The consequence seems ever-smaller risks. The consequence seems to be increased, not reduced, anxiety. There to be increased, not reduced, anxiety. There are always more things that might cause are always more things that might cause cancer and more things to scare us, rencancer and more things to scare us, rendering us blind to the real situation: that dering us blind to the real situation: that we have never lived longer, or been safer. we have never lived longer, or been safer. Clinical psychology has established that Clinical psychology has established that reassuring an excessively anxious person reassuring an excessively anxious person not only fails, but is counterproductive not only fails, but is counterproductive (Warwick & Salkovskis, 1985) . Perhaps (Warwick & Salkovskis, 1985) . Perhaps the same applies to populations as well the same applies to populations as well (Durodie & Wessely, 2002) . (Durodie & Wessely, 2002) .
FROM RISK AVERSION FROM RISK AVERSION TO RESILIENCE TO RESILIENCE
Is this precautionary trend unstoppable? Is this precautionary trend unstoppable? Not necessarily. Because there is one piece Not necessarily. Because there is one piece of the jigsaw that is missing. A glance at of the jigsaw that is missing. A glance at history will confirm that people are not history will confirm that people are not intrinsically risk-averse, provided that they intrinsically risk-averse, provided that they are given reasons why they should accept are given reasons why they should accept the risk. The record of populations under the risk. The record of populations under extreme stress provides numerous examples extreme stress provides numerous examples of resilience in the face of adversity. Our of resilience in the face of adversity. Our own work on psychological reactions to own work on psychological reactions to the London Blitz and the absence of widethe London Blitz and the absence of widespread public panic confirms one wellspread public panic confirms one wellknown example (Jones known example (Jones et al et al, 2004 (Jones et al et al, ), , 2004 ), Thomas Glass's appraisal of the evacuation Thomas Glass's appraisal of the evacuation of the World Trade Center in New York is of the World Trade Center in New York is another . It another . It seems clear that people can behave with seems clear that people can behave with great resilience, even heroism, in circumgreat resilience, even heroism, in circumstances when experts beforehand had stances when experts beforehand had predicted mass panic and civil breakdown. predicted mass panic and civil breakdown. One reason may be that people can see a One reason may be that people can see a wider purpose to accepting these risks, wider purpose to accepting these risks, and also become active participants in the and also become active participants in the process. During the Second World War process. During the Second World War the vast majority of the British public had the vast majority of the British public had some voluntary participation in the war some voluntary participation in the war effort in some shape or form (Jones effort in some shape or form (Jones et al et al, , 2004 (Jones et al et al, , ). 2004 .
In contrast, if all the authorities can In contrast, if all the authorities can offer is safety for its own sake, in which offer is safety for its own sake, in which the only purpose of risk management is to the only purpose of risk management is to reduce risk, then such measures not only reduce risk, then such measures not only fail, but may generate not greater reassurfail, but may generate not greater reassurance but greater anxiety. Maintaining ance but greater anxiety. Maintaining population resilience is not simply a matter population resilience is not simply a matter of reducing risk. Safety first is not enough. of reducing risk. Safety first is not enough. People need to know that there is a wider People need to know that there is a wider purpose to accepting risk. Public health purpose to accepting risk. Public health measures that are based solely on fear, on measures that are based solely on fear, on alarming the public, rarely work, and even alarming the public, rarely work, and even if they remove one source of anxiety, seem if they remove one source of anxiety, seem merely to store up trouble for the next. merely to store up trouble for the next. The challenge is to find a positive agenda The challenge is to find a positive agenda of engagement that is based on more than of engagement that is based on more than simply reducing risk. The goal of a risk-free simply reducing risk. The goal of a risk-free society, let alone a risk-free armed forces, is society, let alone a risk-free armed forces, is unachievable, and probably unpalatable; unachievable, and probably unpalatable; but at present that seems to be the only purbut at present that seems to be the only purpose of policy, which lacks any vision other pose of policy, which lacks any vision other than precaution. 'Better safe than sorry' than precaution. 'Better safe than sorry' may seem sensible, but the danger is that may seem sensible, but the danger is that we will end up no safer, and a lot sorrier. we will end up no safer, and a lot sorrier. 
